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Abstract 
Using data from Vietnam Household and Living Standard Surveys in 2006 and 2008, the 
paper estimates the effect of the receipt of international remittances and internal 
remittances on education, labor and healthcare utilization of children in Vietnam. It shows 
that there are no statistically significant effects of receipt of remittances on school 
enrolment of children as well as child labor. However, receiving international remittances 
helps children increase the number of completed grades by around 2 percent of the 
average completed grade for children. Both international and internal remittances are 
positively associated with the number of outpatient health care contacts.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Migration has been occurring in all the countries. Through mobility, households expect to 
increase income and reduce the risks of income fluctuation (Stark and Taylor, 1991; Stark, 
199, Adams and Page, 2005). The most direct impact of migration on the home 
households is to increase income mainly through remittances (McKenzie and Sasin, 2007). 
Remittances help households relax liquidity constraints, stabilize consumption and invest 
in production (Taylor, 1992).  In addition, migration can have positive effects on human 
capital through transfers of information and advanced knowledge about production skills 
and technology (McKenzie and Sasin, 2007; Taylor et al., 1996). However, migration 
might not lead to higher income and consumption of migrant-sending households, since 
migration can prevent these households from high-return with labor intensive activities 
(Taylor and Lopez-Feldman, 2007). In some special cases, remittances can create a moral 
hazard problem, since recipients can lead to work disincentives (Farrington and Slater, 
2006; Sahn and Alderman, 1996).  
Remittances can have positive effects on children welfare. Through increasing 
income and consumption, remittances can improve health as well as education of children. 
Migration can transfer knowledge and raise awareness of the important role of education 
as well as child care. Child labor is associated with poverty and income shocks (Guarcello 
et al., 2003; Dehejia and Gatti, 2005). Remittances can reduce the child labor, since higher 
and stabilized income can release children from working (Ranjan, 2001; and Shelburne, 
2001).  
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However, migration can lead to negative effects on children. For example, fewer 
adults at home may have a negative impact on the next generation. With less care from 
adults, children might have poorer educational attainment and health, and might have to 
take more housework (Kandel and Kao, 2001; McKenzie and Rapoport 2006; Bansak and 
Chezum, 2009). Households with remittances can promote household business which can 
involve children’s labor (Alcaraz et al., 2012). In addition, as mentioned, if remittances 
and migration does not lead to an increase in income, the positive effect of remittances 
and migration on children through the income channel will be negligible (Azam and 
Gubert, 2006).  
Empirical findings on the sign as well as the magnitude of the impact of migration 
on household welfare are not consistent. Positive impacts of remittances, especially 
international remittances, on household welfare and child education were also found in 
some studies such as Adams (2004, 2006), Taylor et al. (2005), and Acosta et al. (2007). 
There are several studies which find positive effects or at least positive association 
between international remittances and education increase and child labor reduction. 
Edwards and Ureta (2003) and Acosta (2006) found remittances increase school 
attendance for children in El Salvador. Yang (2008) find remittances can increase 
education investment for children and reduce children labor in Philippine. Epstein  and 
Kahama (2008) find that the remittances sent by emigrating parents may reduce child 
labors. Alcaraz et al. (2012) find that a reduction in remittances from the U.S. to Mexican 
households can cause an increase in child labor and a decrease in school attendance of 
children. Evidence on that remittances help increase schooling and reduce child labors can 
also be found in  Dimova et al. (2008), Milgan and Bohara (2007), Mansuri (2006), 
Gonzale-Koning and Wodon (2007), Hanson and Woodruff (2003), Bayot (2007), 
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Benedictis et al. (2010). However, several studies find negligible effects of remittances on 
education such as Borraz (2005) and Nguyen and Purnamasari (2011). Negative effects of 
remittances on education are found in McKenzie and Rapoport (2006), McKenzie (2005), 
Anderson and Kroeger (2011). 
In Vietnam, both internal and international migration have been increasing rapidly. 
According to the 2009 Population and Housing Census, around 6.5 percent of the 
population over 5 years old changed their residence during 2004-2009. The urban 
population share increased from around 24 percent in 2001 to 30 percent in 2009 (Nguyen, 
2012). Vietnam is a country with a large number of people living abroad. Around 3.2 
million Vietnamese live permanently in other countries. The number of annual exported 
laborers increased by 136 percent from 36 to 85 thousand during 2001-2007 (Nguyen and 
Mont, 2010). International remittances have been increasing remarkably over time. During 
the period 1999-2012 the amount of international remittances increased from 1.2 to 9.6 
billion USD. 
There are a large number of studies on remittances and migration in Vietnam. 
Several studies focus on the pattern and determinants of migration (e.g., Dang et al., 1997; 
Dang, 2001; Dang and Nguyen, 2006). Other examines the effect of migration and 
remittances on household welfare and poverty and found positive effect of migration and 
remittance, for example, Brauw and Harigaya (2007), Nguyen (2008), Nguyen (2009), 
Pfau and Giang (2009), Nguyen et al., (2011). However, other studies do not find the 
positive effect of remittances on household consumption and poverty (e.g., Nguyen and 
Mont, 2012; Nguyen et al., 2012).   
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However, there have been no studies in Vietnam on the impact of internal as well 
as international remittances on children welfare indicators including education, healthcare 
and labor. In addition, most studies in other countries focus on international remittances. 
There are no studies comparing the effect of international and internal remittances on child 
welfare. Thus, the main objective of the paper is to examine the impact of internal and 
international remittances on education, health and labor of children aged from 6 to 18 in 
Vietnam. By doing so, this study is expected to contribute to the literature of migration 
and remittances economics by examining the effect of both international and internal 
remittances, and comparing their effects on difference child welfare outcomes including 
education, labor and healthcare utilization.  
The paper is structured into five sections. After this introduction, Section 2 
presents the data set and descriptive analysis of remittances and children in Vietnam. 
Section 3 describes estimation methods. Section 4 presents the estimation of international 
and internal remittances on education, child labor and health care utilization of children. 
Finally, the Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data set and descriptive analysis 
 
In this study, we measure the effect of internal and international remittances on education, 
health and labor for children aged from 6 to 14. We use data from two surveys, Vietnam 
Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS) in 2006 and 2008. The VHLSSs were 
conducted by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO) with technical support from 
the World Bank (WB). Each survey covered around 45,945 households. The samples are 
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representative for the national, rural and urban, and regional levels. The two surveys set up 
two-period panel sub-samples of 20,685 households. The number of individuals in the 
panel data is 78,371. In this study, we limit the analysis to the sample of children aged 6-
18. The number of children in the panel is 21,232. 
The surveys collected information through household and community level 
questionnaires. Information on households includes basic demography, employment and 
labor force participation, education, health, income, expenditure, housing, fixed assets and 
durable goods, participation of households in poverty alleviation programs, and especially 
information on internal and international remittances that households had received during 
the 12 months before the interview. The surveys also contain data on children’s education, 
health and labor during the past 12 months. 
It should be noted that the remittance data collected in VHLSSs include all moneys 
and kinds that households receive from anyone. There are no data on remittances sent to 
households by household members, relatives or friend. Thus, international and internal 
remittances are defined broadly in this paper, and might be considered as international or 
internal private transfers to households. 
Table 1 presents the receipt of international remittances in 2006 and 2008. Around 
6.2 percent of households received international remittances in 20008. International 
remittances are an important income source for receiving households, accounting for 
around 30 percent of household income. Urban households are more likely to receive 
international remittances than rural households. In 2008, the proportion of households 
receiving remittances was 9.3 percent and 5.0 percent in the urban and rural areas, 
respectively. The average size of international remittances inflows was also larger in urban 
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areas, around 28 and 24 million VND for receiving households in urban and rural areas, 
respectively.   
There is also a variation in receiving international remittances by regions. Red 
River Delta is region with the highest proportion of remittance receipt as well as the 
largest remittance amount, while North West Mountain and Central Highlands – the 
poorest regions in Vietnam – are those the lowest proportion of remittance receipt and 
lowest remittance amount.  
Table 1: International remittances in Vietnam by geographic regions 
Regions 
2006 2008 
% household 
receiving 
remittances 
Remittance 
amount 
(thousand 
VND) 
Share of 
remittances 
in total 
income 
% 
household 
receiving 
remittances 
Remittance 
amount 
(thousand 
VND) 
Share of 
remittance
s in total 
income 
Rural/urban 
  
  
  
Rural 4.57 20240.13 33.86 4.99 24197.43 32.34 
 
(0.19) (1122.37) (1.00) (0.19) (1272.45) (1.19) 
Urban 10.31 25748.46 33.02 9.26 28397.70 25.59 
 
(0.55) (3273.53) (1.29) (0.45) (1818.42) (0.92) 
Regions 
  
  
  
Red River Delta 4.21 25257.55 38.52 4.96 36042.23 36.24 
 
(0.27) (3228.16) (1.91) (0.34) (2969.00) (1.51) 
East Northern Mountains 3.43 28675.12 37.74 4.25 23529.99 33.03 
 
(0.33) (4003.73) (2.23) (0.36) (2157.92) (1.93) 
West Northern Mountains 2.96 15949.00 31.31 2.88 9920.10 25.96 
 
(0.56) (4083.76) (5.43) (0.53) (1726.80) (3.36) 
North Central Coast 5.17 17405.66 33.39 7.19 18047.14 31.19 
 
(0.63) (2417.00) (2.49) (0.63) (1731.94) (1.90) 
South Central Coast 5.87 12815.73 25.93 5.49 14947.77 22.27 
 
(0.60) (1259.98) (1.61) (0.54) (1663.34) (2.04) 
Central Highlands 2.77 39897.84 28.38 2.60 6964.03 15.90 
 
(0.34) (13738.91) (3.10) (0.40) (1205.06) (2.59) 
Southeast 12.57 24682.62 33.04 10.29 28824.45 24.21 
 
(0.85) (4395.75) (1.74) (0.69) (2506.05) (1.17) 
Mekong Delta 7.07 21438.62 32.64 6.46 26418.03 31.89 
 
(0.38) (1702.36) (1.39) (0.36) (2164.87) (2.59) 
Total 6.15 22778.67 33.48 6.19 25958.35 29.51 
 
(0.21) (1628.77) (0.80) (0.19) (1068.46) (0.81) 
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Regions 
2006 2008 
% household 
receiving 
remittances 
Remittance 
amount 
(thousand 
VND) 
Share of 
remittances 
in total 
income 
% 
household 
receiving 
remittances 
Remittance 
amount 
(thousand 
VND) 
Share of 
remittance
s in total 
income 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Remittance values are measured in January 2008 price. 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSSs 2006 and 2008. 
Table 2 present the receipt of international remittances over income quintile in 
2006 and 2008. It shows that current international remittances are not pro-poor. A possible 
reason for that received remittances shifted households from the low to the high income 
quintile. In 2006 and 2008, the percentages of the lowest quintile households receiving 
remittances were 1.9 and 2.0 percent, respectively. The richest received substantially 
higher remittances in terms of both percentage as well as the remittance size. The share of 
international remittances in total income is also higher for the rich than the poor.  
Table 2: International remittances in Vietnam by income quintile 
Income quintiles 
2006 2008 
% household 
receiving 
remittances 
Remittance 
amount 
(thousand 
VND) 
Share of 
remittances 
in total 
income 
% 
household 
receiving 
remittances 
Remittance 
amount 
(thousand 
VND) 
Share of 
remittance
s in total 
income 
Poorest 1.88 3026.32 27.17 2.02 3607.67 27.77 
 
(0.18) (367.78) (2.93) (0.19) (682.99) (8.04) 
Near poorest 2.77 4692.21 23.11 3.39 6156.94 21.57 
 
(0.19) (343.53) (1.47) (0.22) (501.16) (1.29) 
Middle 4.08 7594.53 27.18 4.57 9649.78 24.67 
 
(0.23) (380.34) (1.33) (0.25) (516.85) (1.19) 
Near richest 6.71 12075.07 30.29 6.87 15558.44 27.35 
 
(0.34) (523.82) (1.24) (0.33) (793.96) (1.24) 
Richest 14.04 36946.42 39.07 12.67 43589.91 34.14 
 
(0.58) (3148.97) (1.17) (0.51) (2049.33) (1.02) 
Total 6.15 22778.67 33.48 6.19 25958.35 29.51 
 
(0.21) (1628.77) (0.80) (0.19) (1068.46) (0.81) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Remittance values are measured in January 2008 price. 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSSs 2006 and 2008. 
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 While the proportion of households received international remittances is not large, 
most households received domestic remittances (or private domestic transfers): around 86 
and 85 percent in 2004 and 2006, respectively (Table 3). The amount of internal 
remittances is smaller than that of international remittances, around 4.2 million VND per 
receiving household in 2008, account for 10 percent of the total household income. Urban 
households tend to receive higher amount of internal remittances than rural households. It 
should be noted that migration mainly takes place from rural to urban areas, and we 
expected internal remittances per se would be received more likely by rural households. 
Thus, the internal remittances in this study should be interpreted as private transfers than 
remittances sent by people to their home households.   
Table 3: Internal remittances in Vietnam by geographic regions 
Regions 
2006 2008 
% household 
receiving 
remittances 
Remittance 
amount 
(thousand 
VND) 
Share of 
remittances 
in total 
income 
% 
household 
receiving 
remittances 
Remittance 
amount 
(thousand 
VND) 
Share of 
remittance
s in total 
income 
Rural/urban 
  
  
  
Rural 86.48 1739.78 8.47 85.15 3289.32 10.02 
 
(0.51) (33.27) (0.13) (0.51) (72.79) (0.15) 
Urban 84.06 3210.30 9.04 80.88 6712.03 9.97 
 
(1.04) (141.11) (0.29) (1.09) (456.09) (0.29) 
Regions 
  
  
  
Red River Delta 87.45 1973.12 9.29 85.91 4511.47 10.68 
 
(0.97) (61.65) (0.24) (0.96) (181.30) (0.24) 
East Northern Mountains 79.47 1710.64 6.44 75.68 2991.83 7.94 
 
(1.43) (77.10) (0.23) (1.42) (144.17) (0.32) 
West Northern Mountains 60.76 1273.14 6.03 64.07 2023.34 5.96 
 
(2.80) (105.75) (0.54) (2.59) (189.62) (0.48) 
North Central Coast 84.66 1836.09 9.23 80.51 2885.48 11.15 
 
(1.24) (90.41) (0.32) (1.28) (162.57) (0.42) 
South Central Coast 86.39 1604.50 8.32 84.89 3300.36 9.66 
 
(1.40) (77.06) (0.33) (1.32) (242.18) (0.42) 
Central Highlands 92.70 1116.16 4.28 93.56 1875.72 4.90 
 
(1.16) (80.30) (0.29) (0.92) (153.49) (0.32) 
Southeast 82.96 3712.91 10.42 80.58 7399.58 10.41 
 
(1.57) (236.97) (0.46) (1.69) (759.12) (0.45) 
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Regions 
2006 2008 
% household 
receiving 
remittances 
Remittance 
amount 
(thousand 
VND) 
Share of 
remittances 
in total 
income 
% 
household 
receiving 
remittances 
Remittance 
amount 
(thousand 
VND) 
Share of 
remittance
s in total 
income 
Mekong Delta 91.85 2154.45 8.79 90.94 4110.76 11.17 
 
(0.73) (68.68) (0.25) (0.71) (125.49) (0.30) 
Total 85.81 2135.92 8.62 83.95 4212.93 10.00 
 
(0.47) (47.36) (0.12) (0.48) (140.19) (0.14) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Remittance values are measured in January 2008 price. 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSSs 2006 and 2008. 
 
Table 4 shows that the percentage of households receiving internal remittances 
does not very across quintiles. However, the remittance amount is larger for the high 
income quintiles than the low income quintiles.    
Table 4: Internal remittances in Vietnam by income quintile 
Income quintiles 
2006 2008 
% household 
receiving 
remittances 
Remittance 
amount 
(thousand 
VND) 
Share of 
remittances 
in total 
income 
% 
household 
receiving 
remittances 
Remittance 
amount 
(thousand 
VND) 
Share of 
remittances 
in total 
income 
Poorest 85.40 931.59 11.56 82.72 1255.94 11.55 
(0.73) (21.22) (0.31) (0.78) (31.18) (0.34) 
Near poorest 87.12 1356.30 9.07 86.47 2109.30 10.05 
(0.57) (30.40) (0.22) (0.56) (45.78) (0.23) 
Middle 87.31 1725.41 8.05 86.32 2896.89 9.30 
(0.58) (46.05) (0.22) (0.61) (64.62) (0.21) 
Near richest 85.88 2402.10 7.76 84.82 4258.65 9.34 
(0.66) (64.65) (0.21) (0.61) (110.78) (0.23) 
Richest 83.59 4005.80 7.09 79.93 9792.22 10.00 
(0.88) (165.07) (0.23) (1.01) (548.74) (0.28) 
Total 85.81 2135.92 8.62 83.95 4212.93 10.00 
 
(0.47) (47.36) (0.12) (0.48) (140.19) (0.14) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Remittance values are measured in January 2008 price. 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSSs 2006 and 2008. 
 
We use school enrolment and the highest completed grade of children as the 
measurement of child education. For child labor, we use the dummy variable indicating 
whether children had to work for economic activities during the past 12 month, and the 
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number of annual working hours. Regarding the health indicators, based on the 
availability of data, we use the number of annual health care contacts for inpatient and 
outpatient treatments (or the number of times using health care services). 
Table 5 shows that children living in households with international remittances are 
more likely to have higher school enrolment rate and number of completed grades than 
children in households without international remittances. They have lower proportion of 
working and number of working hours than children in households without international 
remittances. Outpatient health care contact is higher for children in households with 
remittances than those in households without remittances.  
Table 5. Children’s outcomes by international remittance receipt 
Children’s outcomes 
2006 2008 
Receiving 
international 
remittances 
Not 
receiving 
international 
remittances 
Receiving 
international 
remittances 
Not 
receiving 
international 
remittances 
Attending school (yes=1) 86.61 81.93 83.92 80.62 
 
(0.79) (0.28) (0.88) (0.32) 
The number of completed grades 6.91 6.54 7.15 6.76 
 
(0.07) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) 
Working for economic activities (yes=1) 11.04 18.22 12.49 19.42 
 
(0.76) (0.34) (0.93) (0.40) 
Number of working hours per year 140.38 222.30 133.20 222.34 
 
(10.85) (4.37) (11.57) (5.08) 
Number of times using outpatient services 
during 52 weeks 
0.75 0.63 0.62 0.58 
(0.06) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) 
Number of times using inpatient services 
during 52 weeks 
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSSs 2006 and 2008. 
 
Children in households with internal remittances and those in households without 
internal remittances are not different in education and labor. However, children in 
households with internal remittances have higher outpatient healthcare contacts than 
children in households without internal remittances.  
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Table 6. Children’s outcomes by internal remittance receipt 
Children’s outcomes 
2006 2008 
Receiving 
international 
remittances 
Not 
receiving 
international 
remittances 
Receiving 
international 
remittances 
Not 
receiving 
international 
remittances 
Attending school (yes=1) 82.16 82.28 80.73 81.20 
 
(0.30) (0.59) (0.33) (0.62) 
The number of completed grades 6.56 6.57 6.77 6.86 
 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) 
Working for economic activities (yes=1) 213.44 243.28 214.33 231.92 
 
(4.44) (10.57) (5.12) (11.59) 
Number of working hours per year 17.74 18.34 18.91 19.61 
 
(0.35) (0.70) (0.40) (0.86) 
Number of times using outpatient services 
during 52 weeks 
0.67 0.46 0.60 0.49 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
Number of times using inpatient services 
during 52 weeks 
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSSs 2006 and 2008. 
 
3. Estimation method 
 
We assume a similar specification for estimating the effect of the internal and international 
remittances on education, health and labor of children: 
 
               ijtjijjtjtjtijttijt vuHIRDRXGY εββββββ ++++++++= 543210 ,  (1) 
 
where Y is a vector including education, health status, and labor of children. The outcome 
variables are presented in Table 5 and 6 above. The subscripts i, j and t refer to child i in 
household j at time t, respectively. Gt is a year dummy, with a one for 2006; This dummy 
is included to allow the intercept to differ between the two periods. This variable enables 
to control for common macroeconomic effects. X is a vector of children’s characteristics 
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such as age and gender. DR and IR are per capita domestic (internal) remittances and 
international remittances, respectively. H  is a vector of control variables with household 
characteristics.; uij and jν  are unobserved time-invariant children and households 
characteristics, respectively. εijt is an error term. 0β is a constant.  
The main problem in estimating equation (1) is the endogeneity of remittances. 
Unobserved characteristics of remittances-receiving households can be different from 
those of households not receiving remittances. Failure to control for such unobserved 
factors leads to biased estimates of the impact of remittances. A standard method to deal 
with the endogeneity problem is instrumental variable regressions. However, finding valid 
instrumental variables is very difficult. Using invalid instruments can result in larger bias 
in the impact estimates.  
In this study, we use the panel nature of the data to avoid this endogeneity bias. A 
main assumption of the method used is that unobserved variables in the outcome equation 
that are correlated with both outcome and remittances remained unchanged during the 
period 2006-2008. In the fixed effects estimator, the constant is allowed to differ per child, 
i.e. 0 0ijβ β= . If the fixed effects estimator is used, the time invariant children and 
household characteristics are removed. In that case,  ij ju ν+  will drop out of the model. 
The marginal impact of internal and international remittances is measured by 2β  
and 3β , respectively.  
 
4. Empirical results 
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Tables 7 and 8 present fixed-effects regressions of child outcomes on remittances. For 
comparison, we also present OLS regressions, but we put the results in Appendix, since 
we will use the fixed-effects regression results for interpretation. In Table 7, the 
remittance variables are two dummy variables indicating whether households received 
international and internal remittances during the past 12 months. It shows that there are no 
statistically significant effects of receipt of remittances on school enrolment of children as 
well as child labor. However, international remittances help children increase the number 
of completed grades by 0.11, just around 2 percent of the average completed grade for 
children. 
 Since the annual contacts are positive and discrete, we applied Poisson regressions. 
Both international and internal remittances are positively associated with the number of 
outpatient health care contact. Receipt of international and internal remittances each 
increase the number of outpatient health care contacts by around 14 percent. Receipt of 
international remittances has a strong effect on inpatient health care contacts. It should be 
noted that the endogeneity of the estimation of the impact of remittances on health can be 
more serious than the estimation of the impact on education and child labor. There can be 
a reverse causality, since households with sick children can receive transfers from 
relatives and friend for health treatment of children. 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
Table 7. Fixed-effects regression and fixed-effects Poisson regressions of child outcomes 
on the dummy variables of remittance receipts 
Explanatory variables 
Dependent variables 
Attending 
school 
(yes=1) 
The 
number of 
completed 
grades 
Working 
for 
economic 
activities 
(yes=1) 
Number of 
working 
hours per 
year 
Number of 
times using 
outpatient 
services 
during 52 
weeks 
Number of 
times using 
inpatient 
services 
during 52 
weeks 
Households receiving 
international remittances (yes=1) 
0.0007 0.1080* 0.0156 0.773 0.1437** 0.6369** 
(0.0124) (0.0502) (0.0128) (19.664) (0.0539) (0.2467) 
Households receiving internal 
remittances (yes=1) 
0.0046 -0.0418 0.0058 -4.343 0.1484** -0.1136 
(0.0066) (0.0267) (0.0068) (10.457) (0.0340) (0.1177) 
Household size 0.0224** -0.1332** -0.0252** -32.066** -0.1149** 0.0106 
 
(0.0032) (0.0129) (0.0033) (5.036) (0.0163) (0.0528) 
Proportion of children below 15 
in households 
0.4776** -5.3812** -0.4761** -603.837** 0.6617** 0.4899 
(0.0199) (0.0811) (0.0207) (31.730) (0.0951) (0.3425) 
Proportion of children above 60 in 
households 
-0.0869 -0.1902 0.0621 126.269 -0.4341 -0.0530 
(0.0552) (0.2246) (0.0574) (87.917) (0.2570) (0.9349) 
Household having crop land 
(yes=1) 
0.0081 -0.5131** 0.0122 -7.079 0.1652 0.0741 
(0.0377) (0.1533) (0.0392) (59.985) (0.1783) (0.6821) 
Log of crop land size 0.0016 0.0467* -0.0004 -0.136 -0.0216 -0.0600 
 
(0.0047) (0.0190) (0.0049) (7.426) (0.0221) (0.0837) 
Constant 0.5150** 9.5113** 0.4778** 616.087** 
  
 
(0.0197) (0.0800) (0.0204) (31.301) 
  
Observations 42011 42011 42011 42011 15180 2620 
R-squared 0.03 0.19 0.03 0.02 
  
Number of children 21232 21232 21232 21232 7590 1310 
Number of households 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSSs 2006 and 2008. 
 
In Table 8, we limit the sample to households with positive values of remittances, 
and use the size of remittances instead of the dummy receipt of remittances. Almost all the 
estimates of remittance amount are not statistically significant. Only the amount of 
internal remittances are positively correlated with the number of completed grade of 
children. 
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Table 8. Fixed-effects regression and fixed-effects Poisson regressions of child outcomes 
on the amount of remittances 
Explanatory variables 
Dependent variables 
Attending 
school 
(yes=1) 
The 
number of 
completed 
grades 
Working 
for 
economic 
activities 
(yes=1) 
Number of 
working 
hours per 
year 
Number of 
times using 
outpatient 
services 
during 52 
weeks 
Number of 
times using 
inpatient 
services 
during 52 
weeks 
Amount of international 
remittances (million VND) 
0.0002 0.0014 -0.0002 -0.209 -0.0003 0.0385 
(0.0006) (0.0024) (0.0005) (0.825) (0.0026) (0.0380) 
Amount of internal remittances 
(million VND) 
-0.0005 0.0193** 0.0005 1.316 -0.0143 0.1166 
(0.0014) (0.0057) (0.0013) (1.956) (0.0104) (0.1024) 
Household size -0.0071 -0.2390* -0.0184 5.066 -0.0731 1.4100 
 
(0.0256) (0.1045) (0.0230) (35.680) (0.1284) (1.4696) 
Proportion of children below 15 
in households 
0.3554* -6.0921** -0.5317** -392.898 2.1842** 6.9608 
(0.1526) (0.6242) (0.1371) (213.082) (0.8121) (4.9416) 
Proportion of children above 60 in 
households 
-0.1308 -2.4559* 0.1152 462.534 0.6838 69.83 
(0.3021) (1.2356) (0.2713) (421.813) (1.5166) (94.77) 
Household having crop land 
(yes=1) 
-0.1536 -1.7746 0.2805 -147.715 1.3887 35.78 
(0.3588) (1.4673) (0.3222) (500.911) (1.6743) (55.36) 
Log of crop land size 0.0081 0.2411 -0.0246 34.589 -0.2109 -2.8980 
 
(0.0481) (0.1966) (0.0432) (67.126) (0.2061) (2.098) 
Constant 0.8150** 10.419** 0.3452** 168.183 
  
 
(0.1419) (0.5803) (0.1274) (198.122) 
  
Observations 1442 1442 1442 1442 234 38 
R-squared 0.03 0.32 0.07 0.02 
  
Number of children 1158 1158 1158 1158 117 19 
Number of households 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSSs 2006 and 2008. 
 
The effect of remittances can vary across different groups. For example, many 
studies found a higher effect of remittances on education for girls than for boy, for 
example Mansuri (2006), Gonzale-Koning and Wodon (2007), Yang (2008). In Table 9, 
we interact the gender of children with the receipt of remittances and examine to examine 
the gender difference in the impact of remittances. We do not find significant gender 
difference in the effect of remittances on child education. However, we find that the 
reducing-effect of remittances on child labor is larger for boy than for girls. 
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Table 9. Fixed-effects regression and fixed-effects Poisson regressions of child outcomes 
on the dummy variables of remittance receipts with interaction with child gender 
Explanatory variables 
Dependent variables 
Attending 
school 
(yes=1) 
The 
number of 
completed 
grades 
Working 
for 
economic 
activities 
(yes=1) 
Number of 
working 
hours per 
year 
Number of 
times using 
outpatient 
services 
during 52 
weeks 
Number of 
times using 
inpatient 
services 
during 52 
weeks 
Households receiving 
international remittances (yes=1) 
0.0004 0.0874 0.0022 7.213 0.1982* 1.1609** 
(0.0176) (0.0714) (0.0183) (27.956) (0.0801) (0.3685) 
Households receiving internal 
remittances (yes=1) 
0.0073 -0.0397 0.0064 18.934 0.0634 -0.1855 
(0.0095) (0.0387) (0.0099) (15.154) (0.0499) (0.1673) 
Households receiving 
international remittances * Child 
gender (boy=1, girl=0) 
0.0008 0.0408 0.0266 -11.924 -0.0955 -1.0618* 
(0.0247) (0.1004) (0.0257) (39.293) (0.1083) (0.5038) 
Households receiving internal 
remittances * Child gender 
(boy=1, girl=0) 
-0.0051 -0.0042 -0.0013 -44.415* 0.1578* 0.1404 
(0.0131) (0.0535) (0.0137) (20.933) (0.0683) (0.2352) 
Household size 0.0224** -0.1332** -0.0252** -32.117** -0.1149** 0.0169 
 
(0.0032) (0.0129) (0.0033) (5.036) (0.0163) (0.0531) 
Proportion of children below 15 
in households 
0.4776** -5.3810** -0.4760** -603.598** 0.6648** 0.5166 
(0.0199) (0.0811) (0.0207) (31.729) (0.0952) (0.3429) 
Proportion of children above 60 in 
households 
-0.0869 -0.1909 0.0617 126.232 -0.4093 -0.0495 
(0.0552) (0.2246) (0.0574) (87.913) (0.2573) (0.9356) 
Household having crop land 
(yes=1) 
0.0083 -0.5129** 0.0123 -6.084 0.1647 0.0502 
(0.0377) (0.1533) (0.0392) (59.983) (0.1784) (0.6828) 
Log of crop land size 0.0015 0.0467* -0.0004 -0.250 -0.0220 -0.0595 
 
(0.0047) (0.0190) (0.0049) (7.426) (0.0221) (0.0838) 
Constant 0.5150** 9.5113** 0.4777** 616.051** 
  
 
(0.0197) (0.0800) (0.0204) (31.299) 
  
Observations 42011 42011 42011 42011 15180 2620 
R-squared 21232 21232 21232 21232 7590 1310 
Number of children 0.03 0.19 0.03 0.02 
  
Number of households 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSSs 2006 and 2008. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
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Vietnam is a developing country with increasing internal and international migration 
There are a large number of studies on remittances and migration in Vietnam. However, 
there have been no studies in Vietnam on the impact of internal as well as international 
remittances on children welfare indicators including education, healthcare and labor. This 
paper examines the impact of internal and international remittances on education, health 
and labor of children aged from 6 to 18 in Vietnam using data from the VHLSSs and 
fixed-effects regressions.   
We find that the receipt of remittances, both international and internal, does not 
have significant effects on school enrolment of children as well as child labor. However, 
the receipt of international remittances help children increase the number of completed 
grades by around 2 percent. We do not find significant gender difference in the effect of 
remittances on child education. Regarding healthcare, both international and internal 
remittances are positively associated with the number of outpatient health care contact. 
The receipt of international and internal remittances each increases the number of 
outpatient health care contacts by around 14 percent. The receipt of international 
remittances is also strongly correlated with inpatient health care contacts.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1. OLS and Poisson regressions of child outcome 
Explanatory variables 
Dependent variables 
Attending 
school 
(yes=1) 
The 
number of 
completed 
grades 
Working 
for 
economic 
activities 
(yes=1) 
Number of 
working 
hours per 
year 
Number of 
times using 
outpatient 
services 
during 52 
weeks 
Number of 
times using 
inpatient 
services 
during 52 
weeks 
Households receiving 
international remittances (yes=1) 
0.0407** 0.4460** -0.0395** -81.154** 0.1647 0.0891 
(0.0109) (0.0772) (0.0111) (17.390) (0.0841) (0.1890) 
Households receiving internal 
remittances (yes=1) 
-0.0007 -0.0718 -0.0098 -19.111 0.4472** 0.0003 
(0.0079) (0.0539) (0.0091) (14.757) (0.0719) (0.1087) 
Household size -0.0310** -0.0495** 0.0275** 47.459** -0.1713** -0.0536 
 
(0.0022) (0.0154) (0.0023) (3.774) (0.0177) (0.0307) 
Proportion of children below 15 
in households 
0.6025** -8.8607** -0.4720** -765.665** 0.9557** 0.5139** 
(0.0157) (0.0956) (0.0166) (27.777) (0.1044) (0.1837) 
Proportion of children above 60 in 
households 
0.2132** -2.8029** -0.1990** -307.531** 0.4593* -0.2682 
(0.0293) (0.1961) (0.0293) (46.146) (0.2157) (0.3684) 
Household having crop land 
(yes=1) 
0.0731* 1.3232** -0.1284** -128.544* -1.8602** -0.4816 
(0.0316) (0.2271) (0.0395) (56.855) (0.2569) (0.3639) 
Log of crop land size -0.0087* -0.1327** 0.0260** 18.716** 0.2098** 0.0425 
 
(0.0038) (0.0279) (0.0049) (7.005) (0.0303) (0.0427) 
Constant 0.7616** 10.0475** 0.1634** 258.291** -0.3475** -2.9917** 
 
(0.0140) (0.0912) (0.0147) (23.444) (0.1125) (0.1831) 
Observations 42011 42011 42011 42011 42011 42011 
R-squared 0.09 0.32 0.07 0.06 
  
Number of households 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSSs 2006 and 2008. 
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Table A.2. OLS and Poisson regressions of child outcome 
Explanatory variables 
Dependent variables 
Attending 
school 
(yes=1) 
The 
number of 
completed 
grades 
Working 
for 
economic 
activities 
(yes=1) 
Number of 
working 
hours per 
year 
Number of 
times using 
outpatient 
services 
during 52 
weeks 
Number of 
times using 
inpatient 
services 
during 52 
weeks 
Amount of international 
remittances (million VND) 
0.0002 0.0017 -0.0004 -0.623* -0.0015 -0.0033 
(0.0002) (0.0017) (0.0002) (0.314) (0.0021) (0.0041) 
Amount of internal remittances 
(million VND) 
0.0010** 0.0039 -0.0006 -0.625 0.0075 0.0118 
(0.0003) (0.0041) (0.0003) (0.457) (0.0044) (0.0062) 
Household size -0.0121 -0.0700 0.0064 24.757 -0.2170** -0.2824** 
 
(0.0078) (0.0581) (0.0080) (12.797) (0.0568) (0.0947) 
Proportion of children below 15 
in households 
0.4955** -8.6910** -0.3577** -473.928** 0.8239* 0.0552 
(0.0611) (0.3803) (0.0571) (93.610) (0.3365) (1.2407) 
Proportion of children above 60 in 
households 
0.2345* -3.3202** -0.1421 -259.936 1.4410 -2.1918 
(0.0956) (0.8305) (0.1066) (150.735) (0.8392) (1.7600) 
Household having crop land 
(yes=1) 
0.0102 1.9401 0.1524 -61.055 -3.8014** -0.4218 
(0.1143) (0.9966) (0.1524) (237.224) (0.9936) (3.1863) 
Log of crop land size 0.0006 -0.2319 -0.0079 12.055 0.4758** 0.0359 
 
(0.0142) (0.1187) (0.0184) (29.232) (0.1152) (0.4119) 
Constant 0.7256** 10.5532** 0.1850** 197.454** 0.1946 -1.6078* 
 
(0.0462) (0.2923) (0.0419) (66.044) (0.2775) (0.7387) 
Observations 1442 1442 1442 1442 1442 1442 
R-squared 0.08 0.31 0.06 0.04 
  
Number of households 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Source: Authors’ estimation from VHLSSs 2006 and 2008. 
 
